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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
The state appeals from the District Court ruling affinning the magistrate's order suppressing 
evidence of the results of a blood alcohol test drawn without a warrant. 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The state charged Derek Michael Arrotta with misdemeanor DUI. (R., p. 9) Mr. Arrotta filed 
a motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of a blood draw. (R., pp. 37-41) At the motion 
to suppress the magistrate made findings of fact including: Trooper Baldwin had probable cause 
to arrest Mr. Arrotta. (Tr. p. 112, Ls. 1-6) Mr. Arrotta was very clear that he refused the 
evidentiary testing including breath and blood test. (Tr. p. 112, Ls. 16-25) Trooper Baldwin told 
Mr. Arrotta that he must provide a blood draw regardless of his refusal. (Tr. p. 113, Ls. 3-8) 
Submitting to the authority of the state does not constitute legitimate consent. (Tr. p. 113, Ls. 3-
8) There was no exigency and that was acknowledged by the State. (Tr. p. 113, Ls. 9-11) The 
state maintains that the state relies on Idaho's implied consent law to support the assertion of 
consent. (Tr. p. 113, Ls. 17-24) The magistrate held that: "Schneckloth v. Bustamante, which is 
not an implied consent case ..... .It's just a totality of the circumstances case ..... to detennine if 
consent is legitimate or not. (Tr. p. 115, Ls. 10-23) "I do not believe that consent implied by 
statute is sufficient to erase ..... a Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search 
and seizure." (Tr. p. 115-116, Ls. 1-1) The court held that a categorical exemption for exigency 
and a categorical exception under implied consent requires a case by case analysis to establish an 
exigency exception. (Tr. p. 117, Ln. 1-18) The government must obtain a warrant absent an 
exception of an exigency. (Tr. p. 117, Ls. 14-18) The court suppressed the results of the blood 
draw. (Tr. p. 121) 
The state appealed to the district court. (R. pp. 67-69) The District Court held: "Judge Judge 
found that Trooper Baldwin had probable cause to stop Arrotta for traffic infraction. He found 
there were no exigent circumstances, that there was no express consent, nor were there any 
exceptions to the warrant requirement that would support the warrantless search." (R. 110 citing 
Tr. p 111:19-112:10,113:7-11) 
Judge John R. Stegner in his opinion noted that Judge Judge found that Missouri v. McNeely, 
133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013), cast doubt on Idaho's implied consent law "sufficient to erase ..... a 
Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizures." (R. 110 citing Tr. p. 
116:1-5) Judge John R. Stegner noted that Judge Judge stated he could not make a "logical 
distinction .... between a categorical per se exception for exigency in [DUI] cases and a 
categorical exception under implied consent." (R. 110-111 citing Tr. p. 117:7-10) Therefore, the 
state was required to obtain a warrant for a blood draw in this case, and had not done so, making 
the invasive search unreasonable. (R. 111) 
Judge Stegner then went on to note that the Implied Consent statute authorizes the imposition 
of a $250 civil penalty and driver's license suspension for one year for refusal. I.C. § 18-8002. 
The court discussed the holdings in State v. Woolery, 116 Idaho 368, 371, 775 P.2d 1210, 1213 
(1980). (R. 112) The court also noted that drivers were not allowed to refuse to take a blood test 
or withdraw the consent to draw blood. (R. 113) The court found that the effect of Woolery and 
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its progeny is to make "any driver in the state of Idaho, whether protesting or not, legally subject 
to a blood test without any requirement to obtain a warrant. (R. 114) The court held Woolery was 
drawn into question by Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013). (R. 114) The court also 
found the facts in Arrotta case strikingly similar to those in the McNeely case. (R. 114) 
The court then conducted an analysis ofthe McNeely case noting the Supreme Court 
discussed the implied consent statutes finding that "in those drunk driving investigations where 
police officers can reasonably obtain a warrant before a blood sample can be drawn without 
significantly undermining the efficacy of the search, the Fourth Amendment mandates that they 
do so" citing McNeely at 1561. (R. 115-116) The court found that McNeely is broader than the 
state "suggests: it holds that per se statutory schemes attempting to circumvent the warrant 
requirement altogether are prohibited." (R. 116) Judge Stegner also noted: "Regarding the State 
of Missouri's attempt at such a scheme, a majority of the Court wrote "Here and in its own 
courts, the State based its case on an insistence that a driver who declines to submit to testing 
after being arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol is always subject to a 
nonconsensual blood test without any precondition for a warrant. That is incorrect." McNeely at 
1568. (Sotomayer, J., joined by Scalia, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Ragen, JJ.) (R. 116) 
The district court went on to hold that Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) 
requires that voluntariness of consent must be based upon the totality of the circumstances 
finding no "single controlling criterion" exists to establish a per se consent exception but that 
there must always be a "careful scrutiny of all the surrounding circumstances." Bustamante at 
226. (R. 116-117) 
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Judge Stegner found: "To adopt the scheme proposed by the State threatens to make the 
Fourth Amendment and Article I § 17 nullities in Idaho. Every driver, indeed any person in 
physical control of a vehicle, would be potentially subject to the invasion of their bodily integrity 
by a hypodermic needle upon a showing of reasonable suspicion ..... precluding any driver from 
being secure in his person against a blood draw, notwithstanding, persistent refusals." (R. 117-
118) The Legislature (or the courts) could just as easily imply irrevocable consent to a 
warrantless search of a car, simply as a prerequisite to driving on a public road. Or they could 
imply irrevocable consent to religious instruction at schools because parents enrolled their 
children in the public school system. The irrevocable implied consent could be used to 
circumvent virtually all constitutional protections. (R. 118) Then Judge Stegner upheld the 
decision of Judge Judge. (R. 118-119) The state appealed. (R. 121-24) 
II. STANDARD ON REVIEW 
The appellate court applies a bifurcated standard accepting the factual findings unless clearly 
erroneous. The court will freely review the application of the constitutional principle to the facts 
found. State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 207 P.3d 182, 183 (2009) 
In conducting the review the District Court found that the United States Supreme Court in 
Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1568 (2013) held that per se or categorical exceptions to a 
warrant requirement were improper. 
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III. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
A. Did the state violate defendant's Fourth Amendment and Article I § 17 right to 
be free from an unreasonable search and seizure by withdrawing defendant's 
blood over his objection and in the absence of exigent circumstances? 
B. Maya defendant arrested for driving under the influence revoke his implied 
consent under I.e. 18-8004? 
e. May the state of Idaho, after Missouri v. McNeely, condition the privilege of 
driving upon an individual's "Implied Consent" to a warrantless blood draw? 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. The state violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment and Article I § 17 right to 
be free from unreasonable search and seizure by withdrawing the defendant's 
blood over his objection and in the absence of exigent circumstances. 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches. 
State v. Jaborra, 143 Idaho 94, 97, 137 P.3d 481, 484 (Ct. App. 2006) Administration of blood 
alcohol testing constitutes a seizure ofthe person and a search within the purview of the Fourth 
Amendment. State v. LeClerq, 149 Idaho 905, 243 P.3d 1093, 1095 (Ct. App. 2010), citing 
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,767,86 S.Ct. 1826, 1833-34, 16 L.Ed.2d 908, 917-18 
(1966); State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007) A search conducted by law 
enforcement officers without a warrant is per se unreasonable unless the State shows that it fell 
within one of the narrowly drawn exceptions to the warrant requirement. Schneckloth v. 
Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218,219,93 S.Ct. 2041,36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); State v. Dominguez, 137 
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Idaho 681, 683,52 P.3d 325, 327 (Ct.App.2002) The state has the burden of overcoming the 
presumption of unreasonableness: 
[t]o overcome this presumption, the State bears the burden of establishing two 
prerequisites. First, the State must prove that a warrantless search fell within 
a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement. Second, the State 
must show that even if the search is permissible under an exception to the 
warrant requirement, it must still be reasonable in light of all of the other 
surrounding circumstances. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). Here, there exists no valid exception to the warrant requirement. 
Thus, the warrantless blood draw must be suppressed. 
MISSOURI V. MCNEELY 
In the recent case of Missouri v. McNeely, a case with facts substantially similar to the case at 
bar, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Fourth Amendment protects drivers from state 
compelled blood draws upon suspicion ofDUI. In so doing, the Court eradicated four decades of 
misinterpretation and misapplication of its prior decision in Schmerber v. California, whereby 
courts across the country had held that DUI suspects possessed no constitutionally protected 
right to be free from compelled warrantless blood draws. 
McNeely had been stopped and arrested for DUI. Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 
1554, 185 L. Ed. 2d 696 (2013) Prior to his arrest, Missouri's implied consent statute had been 
amended to remove a motorists' statutorily granted right to refuse a blood test, instead 
authorizing law enforcement to obtain a warrantless blood draw after a motorist's refusal to 
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submit to a test. l Idaho's implied consent statute likewise purports to authorize law enforcement 
to extract blood after, or in spite of, a motorist's refusal to submit to test. See, I.C. 18 § 8002-
8004; see also, State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007). After his arrest, 
McNeely was asked to provide a breath sample. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1554 McNeely refused. 
Id. Due to the officer's training concerning the nature of Missouri's implied consent law, he 
thereafter transported McNeely the hospital for a warrantless blood draw. /d. 
McNeely argued that the Fourth Amendment prohibited the state from subjecting him to 
a warrantless, nonconsensual blood draw. The State of Missouri and its Amici argued to the 
contrary, asking the Court to put their stamp of approval upon a decades old interpretation of the 
its prior decision in Schmerber v. California, i.e. that the evanescent nature of alcohol, in and of 
itself, constituted exigent circumstances and therefore a per se exception to the warrant 
requirement: 
[t]he State contends that whenever an officer has probable cause to believe an 
individual has been driving under the influence of alcohol, exigent 
circumstances will necessarily exist because BAC evidence is inherently 
evanescent. As a result, the State claims that so long as the officer has 
probable cause and the blood test is conducted in a reasonable manner, it is 
categorically reasonable for law enforcement to obtain the blood sample 
without a warrant. 
In a footnote the Missouri Supreme Court explained the history of Missouri's implied consent law: 
... the former version of section 577.041.1 stated that if a person refused both the breath-analyzer and the 
blood draw test, then "none shall be given." Section 577.041.1, RSMo Supp.2008. However, that section was 
amended prior to Defendant's arrest by the deletion of the phrase "and none shall be given." Section 
577.041.1, RSMo. Supp.20 I O. With the removal of that phrase, the prosecutor asserted that police officers 
now may "rely on the well settled principle that obtaining blood from an arrestee on probable cause without a 
warrant and without actual consent does not offend constitutional guarantees." The prosecutor's assertion rests 
on a fundamental misreading of Schmerber. n 
State v. McNeely, 358 S.W.3d 65, 68 (Mo. 2012), reh'g denied (Mar. 6,2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 98, 183 L. Ed. 2d 737 
(U.S. 2012) and affd, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 185 L. Ed. 2d 696 (U.S. 2013). 
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Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1560, 185 L. Ed. 2d 696 (2013) So the argument went, 
with exigency inherent in each and every DUI case, a driver who declines to submit to testing 
would be subject to a nonconsensual blood test without any precondition for a warrant. Such an 
argument was rejected by the Court: 
[h]ere and in its own courts the State based its case on an insistence that a 
driver who declines to submit to testing after being arrested for driving under 
the influence of alcohol is always subject to a nonconsensual blood test 
without any precondition for a warrant. That is incorrect. 
Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1568, 185 L. Ed. 2d 696 (2013) The Court held that 
exigent circumstances do not exist in each and every DUI case, but rather they must be proven 
by the state and determined on a case by case basis: 
.. .it does not follow that we should depart from careful case-by-case 
assessment of exigency and adopt the categorical rule proposed by the State 
and its amici . ... We do not doubt that some circumstances will make obtaining 
a warrant impractical such that the dissipation of alcohol from the bloodstream 
will support an exigency justifying a properly conducted warrantless blood 
test. That, however, is a reason to decide each case on its facts, as we did in 
Schmerber, not to accept the "considerable overgeneralization" that a per se 
rule would reflect. 
Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1561, 185 L. Ed. 2d 696 (2013)(intemal citations 
omitted). Ultimately, the Court ruled that: 
[i]n those drunk driving investigations where police officers can reasonably 
obtain a warrant before a blood sample can be drawn without significantly 
undermining the efficacy of the search, the Fourth Amendment mandates that 
they do so. 
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Jd. With this ruling, absent a showing of actual exigent circumstances, motorists now possess a 
recognized 4th Amendment protection against warrantless blood draws. 
Moving to the question of exigency, the McNeely Court referred to the "special facts" 
confronting the officer in Schmerber v. California where the Court had previously found exigent 
circumstances to exist. Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1560, 185 L. Ed. 2d 696 
(2013)(citingSchmerberv. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771, 86 S. Ct. 1826,1836,16 L. Ed. 2d 908 
(1966» In Schmerber we had a single officer, in the 1960s, investigating an accident while also 
charged with transporting an injured suspect to the hospital. Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 
1552, 1557, 185 L. Ed. 2d 696 (2013) Further, the Court noted that at the time, there did not 
exist the technological advances now present, nor even the procedure in place, to procure 
warrants telephonically. Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1562, 185 L. Ed. 2d 696 (2013) 
Given those "special facts" and under the circumstances as they existed in that day and age, 
"there was no time to seek out a magistrate and secure a warrant. Schmerber, 384 at 771 That 
simply was not the case here. Exigent circumstances did not exist in this case and thus the 
arresting officer should have attempted to procure a warrant. 
A search conducted by law enforcement officers without a warrant is per se unreasonable 
unless the State proves it fell within one of the narrowly drawn exceptions to the warrant 
requirement. Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218,219,93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 
(1973); State v. Dominguez, 137 Idaho 681, 683,52 P.3d 325, 327 (Ct.App.2002) A search 
conducted with consent that was voluntarily given is one such exception. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. 
at 219,93 S.Ct. 2041; Dominguez, 137 Idaho at 683,52 P.3d at 327 The State has the burden of 
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proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the consent was voluntary rather than the result 
of duress or coercion, direct or implied. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 221, 93 S.Ct. 2041; State v. 
Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 796,69 P.3d 1052, 1057 (2003); State v. Fleenor, 133 Idaho 552, 554, 
989 P.2d 784, 786 (Ct.App.1999); Dominguez, 137 Idaho at 683,52 P.3d at 327 A voluntary 
decision is one that is "the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker." 
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225, 93 S.Ct. 2041. See also, Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 
602,81 S.Ct. 1860,6 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1961) 
In the instance case the facts demonstrate that the police conducted a warrantless blood 
draw after Mr. Arrotta refused the blood draw. (Tr. p. 112, Ls. 1-6) The officer pursuant to 
department policy took a blood draw over the defendant's objection. (Tr. p. 113, Ls. 3-8) 
Mr. Derek Arrotta was forced to allow the police to draw blood without a search warrant. 
Suppression of the warrantless blood draw is the proper remedy and the defense seeks to have 
the appellate court affirm the lower court's decision. 
B. A defendant arrested for driving under the influence may revoke his implied 
consent under I.e. 18-8004. 
To establish consent the state has the burden of demonstrating consent by a 
preponderance of the evidence. State v. Kilby, 130 Idaho 747, 749, 947 P.2d 420,422 (Ct. App. 
1997) The state must show the consent was not the result of duress or coercion, either direct or 
implied. Sckneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 248, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2058, 36 L.Ed 854, 875 
(1973); State v. Whiteley, 124 Idaho 261, 264, 858 P.2d 800,803 (Ct. App. 1993) The 
voluntariness of an individual's consent is evaluated in light of all the circumstances. Whiteley, 
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124 Idaho at 264,858 P.2d at 803 Whether consent was granted voluntarily, or was a product of 
coercion, is a question of fact to be detennined by all surrounding circumstances. State v. 
Hansen, l38 Idaho 791, 796, 69 P.3d 1052, 1057 (2003) 
The evidence demonstrates the refusal of both the breath and blood test. The evidence 
here demonstrates coercion by both direct and implied threats. The argument of consent must fail 
under the facts of this case. The state has not demonstrated an exigency to justify the warrantless 
blood draw and Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. , 133 S. Ct. 1552 (20l3) requires suppression 
of the blood draw. The State ofIdaho does not recognize a good faith exception to the warrant 
requirement. State v. Koivu, 152 Idaho 511,272 P.3d 483 (2012) 
Article I § 17 of the Idaho State Constitution grants greater protection than the Fourth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution. Article I § 17 provides: "The right of the people 
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and 
seizure shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue without probable cause shown by 
affidavit, particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized." 
The Idaho Supreme Court has found that this provision provides Idaho citizens greater protection 
from illegal searches. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has found that Article I § 17 provides greater protection from 
the use of illegally seized evidence. State v. Arrequi, 44 Idaho 43, 254 P. 788 (1927); State v. 
Rauch, 99 Idaho 586 P.2d 671 (1978) The court similarly held that Article I § 17 granted greater 
protection to Idaho citizens and held the Leon good faith exception was contrary to Article I § 
17. State v. Koivu, 152 Idaho 511, 516-518, 272 P.3d 483 (2012) 
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Article I § 17 provides the same type of protection when government seeks to force a 
criminal defendant to provide a blood sample. Article I § 17 assures that the person is protected 
absent warrants "particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to be 
seized". Article I § 17 does not allow for searches absent particular facts related to any particular 
person, a per se search, therefore violates Article I § 17. In applying Article I § 17 the Idaho 
Supreme Court should not allow a per se exception to the warrant requirement in a DUI case. It 
is important to note that the court in State v. Diaz did not consider whether Article I § 17 grants 
greater protection because the argument was not made before the District Court. State v. Diaz, 
144 Idaho 300, 303, 160 P.3d 739, 742 (2007) In light of the courts holding in State v. Koivu, 
152 Idaho 511, 519,272 P.2d 483, 491 (2012) holding there is greater protection under Article I 
§ 17 by not extending Leon good faith exception under Article I § 17. This court should protect 
Idaho citizens from warrantless searches after they refuse the test and revoke consent where there 
are not particular facts justifying the searches as required by Article I § 17. Absent a search 
warrant Article I § 17 requires suppression of the blood draw. 
C. The State of Idaho, after Missouri v. McNeely, may not condition the privilege of 
driving upon an individual's "Implied Consent" to a warrantless blood draw. 
Judge John R. Stegner in his opinion articulated that: "Neither the legislature nor the 
courts of Idaho have the authority to suspend the Fourth Amendment and Article I § 17 by 
imposing irrevocable implied consent in criminal cases. To acknowledge such power would 
essentially render our constitution meaningless. The legislature (or the courts) could just as easily 
imply irrevocable consent to a warrantless search of a car, simply as a prerequisite to drive on a 
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public road. Or they could imply irrevocable consent to religious instruction at schools because 
parents enrolled their children in the public educational system. The irrevocable implied consent 
mechanism could be used to circumvent virtually all constitutional protection." (R. 117-118) 
Here the court was articulating the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. 
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine prohibits the government from conditioning the 
grant of a privilege upon the waiver of a constitutional right. The U.S. Supreme Court set forth 
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine in Frost v. R.R. Comm In o.f State o.f Cal.: 
[i]t would be a palpable incongruity to strike down an act of state legislation 
which, by words of express divestment, seeks to strip the citizen of rights 
guaranteed by the federal Constitution, but to uphold an act by which the same 
result is accomplished under the guise of a surrender of a right in exchange for 
a valuable privilege which the state threatens otherwise to withhold. It is not 
necessary to challenge the proposition that, as a general rule, the state, having 
power to deny a privilege altogether, may grant it upon such conditions as it 
sees fit to impose. But the power o.f the state in that respect is not unlimited, 
and one of the limitations is that it may not impose conditions which require 
the relinquishment o.f constitutional rights. If the state may compel the 
surrender o.f one constitutional right as a condition o.f its favor, it may, in like 
manner, compel a surrender of all. It is inconceivable that guaranties 
embedded in the Constitution of the United States may thus be manipulated 
out of existence. 
Frost v. R.R. Comm'n of State of Cal. , 271 U.S. 583, 593-94,46 S. Ct. 605,607, 70 L. Ed. 1101 
(1926)( emphasis ours) The doctrine has been applied in a number of jurisdictions, including 
Arizona and Georgia, to the granting of the privilege to drive. Those courts dealing with the 
issue have all held that the doctrine prevents the conditioning of the privilege to drive upon the 
waiver of one's Fourth amendment rights. As it is now clear, following McNeely, that motorists 
have a Fourth Amendment right to be free from warrantless blood draws, absent a true showing 
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of exigent circumstances, the state is not free to condition the granting of the privilege to drive 
upon a citizen's waiver of that right. In other words, consent may not be "implied" with respect 
to warrantless blood draws. 
Idaho's implied consent law purports to condition the privilege to drive upon one giving 
their implied consent to a warrantless blood draw upon law enforcement's suspicion ofDUI. 
Idaho's Implied consent Statute, I.C. § 18-8002 provides in part: 
(1) Any person who drives or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle in 
this state shall be deemed to have given his consent to evidentiary testing for 
concentration of alcohol as defined in section 18-8004, Idaho Code, and to have 
given his consent to evidentiary testing for the presence of drugs or other 
intoxicating substances, provided that such testing is administered at the request 
of a peace officer having reasonable grounds to believe that person has been 
driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle in violation of the 
provisions of section 18-8004, Idaho Code, or section 18-8006, Idaho Code. 
I.e. § 18-8002(1) Defendant recognizes that several Idaho courts, prior to McNeely, have held 
that a driver was deemed to have given his "implied" consent to a warrantless blood draw merely 
by driving upon the roadways ofthe statc: 
[u ]nder Idaho's implied consent statute, I.e. § 18-8002( 1), anyone driving on 
Idaho roads is deemed to have impliedly consented to evidentiary testing for 
the presence of alcohol or drugs when a police officer has reasonable cause to 
believe the person was driving under the influence. In other words, "[b]y 
virtue of this statute, 'anyone who accepts the privilege of operating a motor 
vehicle upon Idaho's highways has consented in advance to submit to a BAC 
test.' " Rodriguez, 128 Idaho at 523, 915 P.2d at 1381 (quoting Matter of 
McNeely, 119 Idaho 182,187,804 P.2d 911, 916 (Ct.App.1990». See also 
Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 160 P .3d 739. Implied consent to evidentiary testing is 
not limited to a breathalyzer test, but may also include testing the suspect's 
blood or urinc. I.C. § 18-8002(9) 
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State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 712-13,184 P.3d 215, 218-19 (Ct. App. 2008). However, the 
Defendant would argue that such a conditional grant of the privilege to drive was not considered 
to afoul of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine due to the fact that under pre-McNeely 
jurisprudence it was believed that an individual held no constitutional right to be free from 
warrantless blood draws. See, State v. Bock, 80 Idaho 296, 306, 328 P.2d 1065, 1071 (1958); see 
also, State v. Curtis, 106 Idaho 483, 489, 680 P.2d 1383, 1389 (Ct. App. 1984) As the McNeely 
decision has changed the constitutional landscape in this regard, and it is settled that motorists do 
in fact have a protected Fourth Amendment right to be free from warrantless blood draws, the 
State is prohibited from conditioning the granting of the privilege to drive upon a waiver of that 
right. 
Due to the recency of the McNeely decision, no court holding precedential authority has 
ruled on the constitutionality of states implied consent statutes with respect to compelled blood 
draws. However, as stated infra, a number of courts have dealt with the issue of statutorily 
implying consent to warrantless blood draws where the Fourth Amendment would otherwise 
prohibit such a search, e.g. where probable cause was lacking to suspect the motorist ofDUI. In 
each such case those Courts held that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine prohibited the 
legislature from conditioning the grant of the privilege to drive upon the waiver of the 
protections ofthe Fourth Amendment. In other words, those courts held that the legislature 
could not circumvent the Fourth Amendment by "implying" consent to an otherwise unlawful 
search. State v. Quinn, 218 Ariz. 66, 72-73, 178 P.3d 1190, 1196-97 (Ct. App. 2008), Cooper v. 
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State, 277 Ga. 282, 289-91,587 S.E.2d 605, 611-12 (2003), Hannay v. State, 789 N.E.2d 977, 
986-87 on reh 'gJ- 793 N.E.2d 1109 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) 
In State v. QUinnJ- the Arizona Court of Appeals ruled on the constitutionality of a section 
of the Arizona implied consent law which purported to "imply" a motorists' consent to 
warrantless blood draws absent probable cause to believe the motorist to have been DUI. 
Specifically, the statute at issue sought to imply consent in every instance where a motorist was 
involved in an accident which resulted in death or serious injury to another. State v. Quinn, 218 
Ariz. 66, 69, 178 P .3d 1190, 1193 (Ct. App. 2008) The defendant, Quinn, was involved in such 
an accident. It was undisputed that law enforcement did not possess probable cause to believe 
Quinn to be DUI. Nevertheless, acting under authority of Arizona's implied consent statute, law 
enforcement extracted blood without a warrant and absent actual consent. The State of Arizona 
argued that consent was implied by the operation of statute: 
[t]he State further asserts that, even assuming the statute does not fit within the 
special needs exception, Quinn consented to the search because § 28-673 
specifies that all those who drive a vehicle on Arizona roads consent to such a 
search. In support it relies on Tornabene v. Bonine ex rei. Ariz. Highway 
Deptt, 203 Ariz. 326, 334, ~ 19, 54 P.3d 355, 363 (App.2002), which held, 
"driving in Arizona is not a right, but a privilege, subject to legislative 
mandate." 
State v. Quinn, 218 Ariz. 66, 72, 178 P .3d 1190, 1196 (Ct. App. 2008) In rejecting the state's 
argument, the Court noted that the Fourth Amendment required probable cause for DUI prior to 
the extraction of blood: 
[n]ormally, because any forced extraction of blood by the State invades one's 
expectation of privacy in bodily integrity, the intrusion is subject to the 
requirements of the Fourth Amendment. State v. Jones, 203 Ariz. 1, 9, ~ 27, 
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49 P.3d 273, 281 (2002); see also Schmerber v. Cahfornia. 384 U.S. 757, 
767, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966). As Schmerber explains, the 
State's unconsented-to search of a person's blood requires probable cause to 
believe that the search will reveal the presence of controlled or intoxicating 
substances. 384 U.S. at 768-71, 86 S.Ct. 1826. The Schmerber Court stated 
that: 
[t]he interests in human di!,rnity and privacy which the Fourth Amendment 
protects forbid any [ ] intrusions [into a person's blood] on the mere chance 
that desired evidence might be obtained. In the absence of a clear 
indication that in fact such evidence will be found, these fundamental 
human interests require law officers to suffer the risk that such evidence 
may disappear. ... 
Id. at 769-70, 86 S.Ct. 1826. 
State v. Quinn, 218 Ariz. 66, 68-69, 178 P .3d 1190, 1192-93 (Ct. App. 2008) Applying the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine to the statute, the Court ruled the statute an unconstitutional 
exercise oflegislative authority: 
... states may not condition the grant of a privilege on the forfeiture of a 
constitutional right..."a statute cannot circumvent a firmly established 
constitutional right." 
As Schmerber makes clear, Quinn's constitutional right is to be free of any 
searches of her blood "[i] n the absence of a clear indication" that her blood 
would demonstrate the presence of alcohol or other controlled substances. 
Thus, within the limits ofthe Constitution, the State cannot condition Quinn's 
driving privilege on the surrender of her constitutional right not to have 
evidence admitted against her in a criminal prosecution that was taken from 
her without a consent and in the absence of probable cause. 
State v. Quinn, 218 Ariz. 66, 73, 178 P .3d 1190, 1197 (Ct. App. 2008). 
In Cooper v. State, 277 Ga. 282, 587 S.E.2d 605 (2003), the Georgia Supreme Court dealt 
with a statute nearly identical to that in Quinn: 
17 
[u]nder OCGA § 40-5-55(a), because Cooper was involved in an accident 
resulting in "serious injuries," as defined in subsection (c) of the statute, he 
was deemed by operation oflaw to have given consent to the administered 
blood test to determine if there was the presence of alcohol or any other drug. 
Cooper v. State, 277 Ga. 282,285,587 S.E.2d 605, 608 (2003)(citations omitted). The Georgia 
Court noted: 
[t]he high courts of several other states have grappled with the constitutionality 
of provisions allowing the chemical testing of bodily substances without 
probable cause or valid consent, and based solely on a serious traffic mishap. 
These courts have uniformly rejected provisions which obviate the finding of 
probable cause. See McDuffv. State, 763 So.2d 850 (Miss.2000); Blank v. 
State, 3 P.3d 359 (Alaska 2000); King v. Ryan, 153 Ill.2d 449, 180 IlI.Dec. 
260, 607 N.E.2d 154 (1992); Commonwealth v. Kohl, 532 Pa. 152, 615 A.2d 
308 (Pa.1992). Compare State v. Roche, 681 A.2d 472 (Maine 1996). 
Cooper v. State, 277 Ga. 282, 287-88, 587 S.E.2d 605, 609-10 (2003). The Court then held, as 
did the Court in Quinn that an implied consent statute could not act to imply consent where to do 
so would require the waiver of a motorist's Fourth Amendment right to be free from 
unreasonable search and seizure: 
[t]his Court's use of the term "suspect" in regard to the Implied Consent 
Statute brings into sharp focus the flaw in that portion of the statute compelling 
chemical testing of the person merely by virtue of involvement in a traffic 
accident resulting in serious injury or fatality. There is no requirement of 
individualized suspicion, much less probable cause, that would render the 
person "suspect" of impaired driving. 
Thus, to the extent that OCGA § 40-5-55(a) requires chemical testing of the 
operator of a motor vehicle involved in a traffic accident resulting in serious 
injuries or fatalities regardless of any determination of probable cause, it 
authorizes unreasonable searches and seizures in violation of the State and 
Federal Constitutions. 
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Cooper v. State, 277 Ga. 282,290,587 S.E.2d 605, 611-12 (2003) In so holding the Court cited 
the following language from the Indiana Court of Appeals in Hannoy v. State, 789 N.E.2d 977, 
987 (Ind.App.2003): 
[t]he legislature cannot, however, abrogate a person's Fourth Amendment 
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, as defined by the 
Supreme Court. To hold that the legislature could nonetheless pass laws 
stating that a person "impliedly" consents to searches under certain 
circumstances where a search would otherwise be unlart;ful would be to 
condone an unconstitutional bypassing of the Fourth Amendment. 
Cooper v. State, 277 Ga. 282, 290, 587 S.E.2d 605, 611-12 (2003) The Court concluded by 
stating: 
"The requirements of the Fourth Amendment cannot be lowered based upon 
the heinousness of the particular crime police are investigating." Hannoy v. 
State, supra at 988. The illegally-obtained test results were not admissible 
against Cooper at trial, and the trial court erred in denying Cooper's motion to 
suppress such evidence. 
Cooper v. State, 277 Ga. 282, 291, 587 S.E.2d 605, 613 (2003) 
In Hannoy v. State, 789 N .E.2d 977, on reh g.1 793 N .E.2d 1109 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), the 
Indiana Court of Appeals addressed the constitutionality of the Marion County Sheriff 
Department's policy of obtaining blood samples without probable cause from drivers involved in 
accidents resulting in serious bodily injury or death. !d. Hannay was involved in an accident 
involving the death of another individual and, as in Quinn and Cooper, law enforcement lacked 
probable cause to believe Hannoy to be DUI. Rejecting a "special needs" argument as well as an 
argument that Indiana's implied consent statute authorized the blood draw, the Court found the 
warrantless blood draw unconstitutional: 
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[t]he requirements of the Fourth Amendment cannot be lowered based upon 
the heinousness of the particular crime police are investigating. We are well 
aware of the pain and suffering inflicted by intoxicated drivers on our roads. 
Nevertheless, we do not perceive that our opinion today, which will apparently 
require alterations in the standard policy of at least one major Indiana law 
enforcement agency, wiIl unduly burden law enforcement officers in collecting 
blood alcohol readings in cases such as this ... To the extent our holding today 
may lead to the loss of blood alcohol or illicit drug content evidence in some 
cases, we heed the words of the Supreme Court in Schmerber that the Fourth 
Amendment imposes limitations on the ability of police to investigate criminal 
activity and sometimes requires police to "suffer the risk" that certain evidence 
thereby will not be obtained. 384 U.S. at 770, 86 S.Ct. at 1835. 
The withdrawal of Hannoy's blood was not obtained pursuant to the 
guidelines in the implied consent statutes and cannot be justified as being 
drawn in accordance with those statutes. The withdrawal was not 
accomplished in accordance with the Fourth Amendment and Schmerber 
because there was no probable cause to believe Hannoy was intoxicated at the 
time his blood was drawn and no actual, knowing, and voluntary consent to 
the withdrawal. The "special needs" exception to the probable cause 
requirement cannot be applied in the context of a criminal investigation by 
law enforcement. Therefore, the blood alcohol content evidence obtained 
from the blood draw performed at the request oflaw enforcement was 
illegally obtained and should not have been admitted into evidence by the trial 
court. 
Hannay, at 987-89 on reh'g~ 793 N.E.2d 1109 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) 
The McNeely Court gave the clear mandate that "[i]n those drunk driving investigations 
where police officers can reasonably obtain a warrant before a blood sample can be drawn 
without significantly undermining the efficacy of the search, the Fourth Amendment mandates 
that they do so." Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552,1561,185 L. Ed. 2d 696 (2013) Thus, 
after McNeely, a motorist arrested on suspicion of DUI now clearly has a constitutional right to 
be free from warrantless intrusions into their body absent the existence of either a true showing 
of exigent circumstances cause or actual valid consent. As such, the unconstitutional conditions 
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doctrine now prohibits the legislature from bypassing constitutional protections ofthe Fourth 
Amendment and implying, or otherwise requiring, consent upon the act of accepting the 
privilege to drive. Thus, the Diaz decision cited by the State is inapplicable to this instant case. 
Consent cannot be implied when we are dealing with the prospect of "consenting away" a valid 
Fourth Amendment right. As Judge John R. Stegner articulated: "The irrevocable implied 
consent mechanism could be used to circumvent virtually all constitutional protections:' The 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine mandates the courts upholding of the District Court's 
decision suppressing the warrantless blood draw. 
I. CONCLUSION 
The defendant in a driving under the influence case should not be held to have consented 
to a warrantless blood draw after refusing the breath test and blood draw. The Fourth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I § 17 of the Idaho State Constitution require a 
warrant before conducting forced blood draws. The defense respectfully seeks to have the 
District Court's decision upheld. 
Respectfully submitted this l day of April, 201 ¥ 
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